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21 November 1950

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

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17202

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's
Conference Room, Administration Building
Central Intelligence Agency, on 21 November 1950

Director of Central Intelligence
Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,
Department of State
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army
Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters, United States Air Force
Dr. Walter F. Colby, Director of Intelligence, Atomic
Energy Commission
Brigadier General Vernon E. Megee, USMC, Deputy Director for
Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Mr. Victor P. Keay, acting for Assistant to the Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Ludwell Montague, Central Intelligence Agency
Mr. Allan Evans, Department of State
Mr. Charles C. Stelle, Department of State
Colonel Hamilton H. Howze, Department of the Army
Captain John M. Ocker, USN, Department of the Navy
Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy
Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force
Lieut. Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force
Captain R. G. McCool, USN, The Joint Staff

Acting Secretary
Mr. James Q. Reber
Central Intelligence Agency

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Chinese Communist Intervention (NIE-2/1)

1. Action: Approved the draft estimate on the above subject as amended and as finally produced as National Intelligence Estimate 2/1.

2. Discussion: In the discussion, out of which developed the conclusions set forth in the final estimate, attention was focused on this issue: does available intelligence support the earlier estimate that Communist objectives are limited in the Korean situation. The State Department, on reappraisal, believed that available intelligence indicates the Communist intention to drive us out of Korea. Specifically attention was called to:

a. The consistency of the Communist propaganda line that the UN forces are intent on making war on China and therefore they would have to get out of Korea.

b. The shift of the Communist armies *from South China* along the Yalu River and the building up of forces in that area, especially in that the build-up preceded the UN Pyongyang landing. *checked per D HK Bureau June 25*

c. Very active Chinese intervention in Korea incurred such risks as would not have been incurred for a limited purpose.

d. The war readiness activities in Chinese cities ~~and~~ the USSR.

3. By and large the military point of view was that it is not the Communist intention to drive us out of Korea since they do not have the capability and that the available intelligence by itself did not require the amendment of the earlier estimate that the Chinese have limited objectives in Korea. According to the Military members the Chinese Communists in Korea are lacking in equipment and firepower now and it is not expected that this could be sufficiently improved, for reason of difficulties of logistical support in Manchuria, to support an all out effort.

4. It was the consensus that with all out effort the Communists could push us back to defended lines at the narrowest part of the Peninsula. If we were determined to remain in Korea there

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would follow a long war of attrition plus intensified guerrilla activity behind our lines with the probable expectation on the part of the Communists that such a situation would not be tolerable for the UN forces and particularly the American people.

Soviet Participation in the Air Defense of Manchuria (Draft)

5. Action: Approved this draft estimate as amended. The redraft is set forth as the National Intelligence Estimate 2/2.

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